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Abstract: We analyze the problem of extending a given bilateral principle of justice to a
consistent bankruptcy rule for n-creditor bankruptcy probletns. Based on the bilateral principle,
we build a family of binary relations on the set of creditors in order to make bilateral
comparisons between them. We found that the possibility of extending a specific bilateral
principle of justice in a consistent way is closely related to the quasi-transitivity of the binary
relations mentioned above.
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1. INTRObUCT10N
"I'he principle of bilateral comparisons is central in the theory of choice, be it social or individual
choice. Clearly, in order to make bilateral comparisons a binary relation is needed. However,
if~ we want these bilateral comparisons to yield a sensible choice rule, we need to impose some
restriction on the binary relation on which the pairwise comparisons are based. Indeed, Sen
(1969) showed that a necessary and sufficient condition for a complete binary relation to
generate a choice function is that this binary relation be quasi-transitive~. To interpret this
result, note that any complete binary relation induces a choice function for 2-alternative choice
problems. Sen's result tells us that this 2-alternative choice futtction can be extended to any
finite-alternative choice function if and only if the binary relation we started with is quasi-
transitive.
An alternative use of the principle of bilateral comparisons has been suggested in the
context of fair division problems (see for example Harsanyi (1959) and Lensberg (1987)). The
idea is that an outcome in an n-person division problem should not be considered fair when it
is unfair when considering some pair of individuals. In other words, an outcome of an n-person
fair division problem should not be considered fair if there is some pair of individuals in which
one individual gets more than his fair share, when compared to the other individual. This
alternative use of the principle of bilateral comparisons assumes that when we have a fair
division problem involving only two individuals, we know to state what is a fair outcome. That
is, that we have a principle that singles out a fair division in two-person problems. The question
that arises is whether there are any conditions that allow us to extend this two-person principle
to a finite-person fair decision rule, in a consistent way.
'Quasi-transitivity of a complete binary relation is equivalent to the transitivity of its
asymmetric part.3
Our main result is that this alternative use of the principle of bilateral comparisons is also
related to yuasi-transitivity when it is applied to allocation rules in the context of bankruptcy
rrohlcros. Wc found that in order to be able to extend a 2-person bankruptcy rule to an n-person
hankruptcy rule in a consistent manner, the 2-person rule should define a quasi-transitive binary
relation on the set of creditors, for any feasible allocation.
In order to prove our result, we define a family of bankruptcy rules, which is interesting
in itself. This is the family of bankruptcy rules that are consistent on average. If consistency
requires that the outcome should be fair when comparing any two individuals, consistency on
average will require that the outcome should be fair only on average, after having carried out
all the pairwise comparisons. We show that any given two-person bankruptcy rule has a unique
extension which is consistent on average. Further, if the initial 2-person rule happens to have
a consistent extension, then the consistent on average ntle is precisely this consistent extension.
Moreover, given the bilateral rule, the recommendation given by the average consistent
extension to any specific bankruptcy problem, can be easily computed based only on the bilateral
principle of comparisons that generated it. The importance of this family of rules is that they are
a natural generalization of the consistent rules, and in contrast to them, there is always an
average consistent rule with respect to any arbitrary bilateral principle of comparisons.
Our paper is related to Young (1987) who shows that a symmetric and continuous
bankruptcy rule is consistent if and only if it is representable by a continuous parametric
function. From this we can conclude that a symmetric and continuous 2-person rule can be
extended in a consis[ent way if and only if it has a parametric representation. Moreover, a
parametric representation of a rule induces an interval presentation a la Fishburn (1970) of our
binary relation on the set ofcreditors. Young (1987) also shows that a symmetric attd continuous
bankruptcy rule is consistent if and otily if its recommendations maximize a symmetric,4
continuous, additively separable and strictly concave functioa All those results give alternative
insights on the concept of consistency, which proved to be central in the analysis and
characterization of many prominent solution concepts. We believe that the main result of our
paper gives another interesting view on the concept of consistency.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the formal treatment of bankruptcy
problems. Section 3 deals with bilateral principles ofjustice and shows how they can be used
to evaluate the fairness of allocations. The main result on the relation between consistency and
the quasi-transitivity of the binary relations generated by the bilateral principles of justice is also
stated in this section. Section 4 presents the concept of consistency on average and shows that
together with any monotone bilateral principle it characterizes a unique bankruptcy rule, which
is furthrr used to prove the main result. Other results concerning strictly monotone rules are also
shown. Scction 5 concludes.
2. THE AXIOMATIC BANKRl1PTCY MODEL
A bankruptcy problem is a pair (E;d) where d E R; is a vector of nonnegative real numbers (the
claims), which are indezed by some finite nonempty subset I of natural numbers (the creditots),
and OSESE;E,d;-:D. E is the estate to be allocated, and D is the sum of the claims.
An allncation in (E;d) is a vector x E R; such that E,E,x; - E and z; 5d; for all i E I. The
srt ul all alhxations in (G;d) will tx denotcd by A(E;d).
Remark: For any list of claims dER;, any vector xER; wíth x;5d; is an allocation of the
bankruptcy problem (E;E,x;;d). Therefore, when there is no danger of confusion, we shall call
any such vector x an allocation without specifying the bankruptcy problem [o which it refers.
A rule is a function that assigns to each banlwptcy problem a unique allocation.
Examples:5
a) The proportional rule is defined as follows:
Pr(E;d) - ad, where )`D - E.
"1'he propurtional rule allocates awards proportionally to the claims. The proportionality principle
was favored by the philosophers ofancient Greece, and Aristotle even considered it as equivalent
to justice.
b) The constrained eyual award (CEA) rule is defined as follows:
CEA(E;d) - x where x; - min (1`, d;) and )` solves the equation E;E~min (l,,d;)-E.`
This rule assigns the satne sum to all creditors as long as it dces not exceed each creditor's
claim. This rule is also very ancient, and was adopted by important rabbinical legislators,
including Maimonides.
The CEA rule awards to any creditor who claims more than the whole estate, the same
amount it awards to a creditor who claims exactly the whole estate. The excess of a claim over
the estate is completely ignored by the CEA rule. The proportional rule, on the contrary, takes
into account the entire claim. The following example shows a rule that combines the
proportionality principle with the principle that excesses of claims over the estate should be
ignored.
c) The modified proportional (MP) rule is defined as follows:
MP(E;d)-Pr(E;(d n E)),
where the ith component of [he vector d ~ E is min {d;,E}.
The MP rule allocates awards proportionally to the relevant claims. For a cooperative bargaining
motivation of this rule, see Dagan and Volij (1993).
A rule f is monotone if for all (E;d) and 05E' ~E, f(E';d) 5 f(E;d). Monotonicity says
'This equation has a unique solution when D~ E. If D-E, any solution ]` is greater than or
equal to the maximum claim and therefore x; - d; for all i.6
that a decrease in the estate dces not benefit any credi[or. A rule f is strictty monotone if for all
(E;d) and 05 E' G E, if d; ~ 0 then f;(E';d) G f;(E;d). Strict monotonicity says that a decrease
in the estate makes every non-zero creditor worse off. Clearly, strict monotonicity implies
monotonicity.
A rule f is anonymous if for all bankruptcy problems (E;d) and for all permutations a of
the set of players I, f~~;~(E;d)-f;(E;a(d)) where the vector of claims o(d) is defined by a;(d)-do~;,.
Anonymity requires that the awards should not depend on the names of the players.
Let (E;d) be a given bankruptcy problem with set of creditors I. For each nonempty
subset of creditors J and for each allocation x in (E;d) the reduced bankruptcy problem ofJwith
respect to x is (E~E~x~;d~J), where d~J is the restriction of d to R;.
A rule f is consistent if for any finite nonempry set I of creditors
for all (E;d), dERt, for all Qi ~JCI,
f(E;d) - x~ x~J - f(E;E~x;, d~J). (1)
A rule f is cunsislenl it liir each bankniptcy problem (E;d) and subset J of credilors, if
f chooses x in (E;d), then f chooses x ~J in the reduced bankruptcy problem of J with respect to
x. The intetpretation of consistency is as follows. Suppose that a tule f assigns allocation x to
the bankruptcy problem (E;d). Suppose, too, that some subset of creditors wants to reallocate
the total amount E;,~x; assigned to them. If we apply the same tule f to allocate this amount
among these creditors, each one will get the amount originally assigned to him, provided f is
consistent. Consistency in the setup of bankruptcy problems was first discussed by Aumann and
Maschler (1985) and further analyzed by Young (1987, 1988). All the rules presented in the
above examples are monotone and anonymous. Strict monotonicity is not satisfied by the CEA
rule, and the MP rule is not consistent.~
3. ON BILATERAL COMPARISONS, JUSTICE AND CONSISTENCY
Since every bankruptcy problem is a legal problem, solutions to it should be guided by the value
of justice. It is natural then, to ask what are the necessary properties of bankruptcy rules that
make them consistent with the value of justice. Clearly, anonymity is an essential ingredient of
justice. An alla:ation rule can hardly be called just if the names of the creditors are not
irrelevant for the division of the estate. Monotonicity is also a property that should be present
in any bankruptcy rule consistent with justice. Indeed, our intuition of justice tells us that if,
starting from a just position, transferring some amount of money from creditor A to creditor B
is unfair, then transferring the same amount from A to B and taking some more money from A
a fortiori is unfair. It is not clear, however, whether the consistency property of bankruptcy rules
has something to do with justice. Now, whatever for~rt the value of justice may take, we should
expect it to enable us to determine whether a creditor i received better or worse treatment than
creditor j at any given allcx;ation. For example, if we believe that justice is proportionality, then
we would say that i is treated better than j at allocation x, if i receives a larger proportion of his
claim than j does. According to this principle of justice, an allocation will treat i and j equally
if they receive the same proportion of their claims. Obviously, we can think of other notions of
justice. Yet, in order to make these pairwise comparisons we need only a bilateral principle of
justice.
A óilatera!princip[e is a function that singles out a unique allocation to every two-person
bankruptcy problem. We interpret this unique allocation as the just allocation of the problem
according to the bilateral principle. We shall say that any other allocation in the two-person
problem treats one creditor better than the other since i[ awards one creditor more than his "fair"
share. Any rule, when applied to two-person problems, is an example of a bilateral principle.
Conceptually, however, bilateral principles differ from two-person allocation rules. The former8
singles out a just allocation that enables us to make pairwise comparisons, while the latter
allocates the estate in two-person problems.
Given a bilateral principle f, a list of claims d and an allocation x 5d, we can define the
following binary relation on [he set of credi[ors I:
~, - {(i,j)Elxt ~ f;(x,fx;;(d;,da))cx;}.s
i-,j mcans that x treats i Ix~tter than j according to f, or more shortly, x[reats i f-better than j.
Obvíously, if i~,j then t~(x;tx~;(d;,d~))~x~. Note that if i~,j, then i~~j for any other allocation
y in whích y,-x; and y~-x~. That is, whether i is treated f-better than j or not is independent of
the amounts assigned by x to other creditors. Further note that ~, is irreflexive, nobody can be
treated better than himself.
We define the relations ~x and -, by replacing C in the definition of ~, with 5 and -
respectively. Clearly, ~, is a complete binary relation. Following Sen (1969), we say that z~ is
quasi-transitive if and only if Y, is transitive. Transitivity of ~, will play a central role in what
follows. The above relations have the obvious interpretation. In particular, we shall say that an
allocation x treats creditors i and j f-equa!!y if i-,j. An allocation in (E;d) is said to be f-just
if it treats every two creditors f-equally.
There is an interesting relation between the consistency of a bankruptcy rule f and the
existence of f-just allocations. It follows directly from [he definition of consistency that if f is
consistent, then in every bankruptcy problem there exists an f-just allocation. What is not so
obvious is that when the bilateral principle is monotone, the converse is also true. Namely, if
for every bankruptcy problem there exists an f-just allocation, then the bankruptcy rule f is
consistent. This result is a simple extension of Aumann and Maschler (1985) Theorem A and
Corollary 3.1.
`For i-j, we define f;(x,fx~;(d;,d~)) to be x;.9
An appealing feature of f-just allocations is that no creditor can complain about being
treated worse than any other one. Unfortunately, there are bilateral principles f with no
consistent generalization, that is, for some bankruptcy problems f-just allocations cannot be
found. Consider for example the bankruptcy problem (E;d)-((400; 100, 200, 300). When the
bilateral principle is the MP rule, there is no f-just allocation in it. This will follow from our
theorem 3.2 after taking into account that for x-(70.42, 134.08, 195.50), the relation ~, is not
transitive. However, when f-just allocations exist, they can be used as a s[andard of comparison
between players, as the following lemma states:
LewtMn 3.1 (Dagan, Setrano and Volij (1993, lemma 3.3)): Let f be a monotone and anonymous
principle and let (E;d) be a bankruptcy problem. Assume that there exists an f-just allocation in
(E;d) and denote it by x~`. Let x be an allocation in (E;d) in which there are two creditors i and
j with x; 5 x~` and x~ ?xj. Then, j zxi. Moreover, if both inequalities are strict, then j~,i.
Proof:
Case 1: x,fxt?x~`fx~`. By monotonicity and f-justice,
f;(x;fx~;(d;,dt))?f;(x;`-}-x~`;(d;,dt))-x'~x;. Hence, jz,i.
Case 2: x; fx~ c x~`f x~`. By monotonicity and f-justice,
fj(x;-1-x~;(d;,d~))Sfj(x~`fx~`;(d;,d~))-x~`5xt. Hence, j~xi.
This proves the first part of the claim. As for the second part, it is proved analogously and is
left to the reader. o
If we are going to use a bilateral principle f for hilateral comparisons, it is desirable that
the relations ~~ it defines should be transitive. For if we find an allocation x at which creditorlo
i is trralcJ (-Ixttcr than j, creditor j is treated f-tx~tter than k and creditor k is lreated f-txller
than i, it c.ui tx argued that [he bilateral cumparisons that arise from f are meaningless. We feel
that, when bilateral comparisons are meaningful, f-just allocations are more appealing than other
allocations. This is so since, the injustice of the latter is more evident, in this case. It turns out
that to ensure meaningful bilateral comparisons, the bilateral principle f has to have a consístent
extension. A consistent extension of a bilateral principle g is a consistent allocation rule that
coincides with the bilateral principle for 2-creditor bankruptcy problems. The existence of such
a rule is eyuivalent to the existence of f-just allocations in all bankruptcy problems. The relation
between the transitivity of the binary relation and consistency is stated formally as follows:
THEORGM 3.2: Let f be a monotone and anonymous bilateral principle. For each bankruptcy
problem (E;d) there exists a unique f-just allocation if and only if for each bankruptcy problem
(E;d) and for each allocation x in it, ~x is transitive.
The anonymity of the bilateral principle is actually not needed for the above result, and
also for the results in Section 4 below, apart for the "if" part of Theorem 4.8. We assume
anonymity , as we find it a natural assumption, and since it simplifies the notation. We can
interpret this theorem as saying that a bilateral principle of justice can be extended to a
consistent bankruptcy rule if and only if it provides meaningful bilateral comparisons. We leave
the proof for the following section.
Young (1987) considered bankruptcy rules that have a parametric representation: Let
g(d,~) be a real valued function of two scalar variables d and 1`, where d?0 and ~ ranges over
some closed interval [a,b] of the extended reals, and g is continuous and non decreasing in ~,
g(d,a)-0 and g(d,b)-d. A rule f has a parametric representation, if there exists a function g as11
above, which satisfies:
x-f(E;d) iff 3~ vi [x;-g(d;,~), I;;E~x;-E ].
Young (1987,Theorem 1) showed that the class of rules [hat have a parametric representation
is identical to the class of symmetric, continuous, and consistent rules.Tltis class is identical also
to the class of anonymous, monotone, and consistent rules.Given a parametric representation g,
of a rule f, a numerical presentation of ~x can be constructed. Define for each claim d, and for
each amount x~d the following values:
~.(d,x) - inf { a ~ g(d,i`)-x }
~`(d,x) - sup { ), ~ g(d,~)-x }
Now, it is straightforward to verify that:
ir~j iff ~.(d„x~) 1 ~~(d;,x;).
This kind of interval presentation of binary relations was analyzed by Fishburn (1970,pp.18-22).
4. ~N AVERAGE CONSISTENCY OR CONSISTENCY ON AVERAGE
An appealing feature of f-just allocations is that no creditor can complain about being treated
worse than any other creditor. However, as stated above, for some bankruptcy problems f-just
allocations cannot be found. In these cases we face two alternatives: either we abandon the
bilateral principle or we give up f-justice. There must be a very good reason for a society to
abandon a bilateral principle in which it believes and it is not clear to us that the potential non
existence of an f-just allocation justifies such a drastic measure. In this section, we present a
weaker notion of consistency and f-justice that is compatible with any bilateral principle of
justice. If one is willing to accept this weaker notion, then one dces not have to give up any
bilateral principle.
Let (E;d) be an n-creditor bankivptcy problem and let f be a monotone and anonymous12
bilateral principle. An allocation x'E A(E;d) is said to be fju.rt on average (or average fjust)
if for all creditors i
E;:~[f~(x'f-x':(d~.d;))-x~] - o.
In order to understand this definition, note that x! is the amount awarded to creditor i
at allocation x~` and similarly for xj. f;(x~fx;';(d;,d;)) is the amount i should receive if i and j
were to divide the amount x! f x' they received f-equally between them. Hence f;(x~` tx~`;(d;,d;))-
x~` is the amount that creditor j should give creditor i in order to divide justly the sum assigned
to them. It can be interpreted as the amount j owes i. fjustice on average requires from an
allocation that the total debt of each creditor is zero. Clearly, this is a weaker condition than f-
justice that requires that no one owes anything to anyone. The concept of average fjustice is
ínspired by Maschler and Owen's (1989) 2-consistency in hyperplane games.
The following result will allow us to provide a well-defined bankruptcy rule:
PttoPOS[Ttort 4.1: Let f be a monotone and anonymous bilateral principle. For every bankruptcy
problem there exists a unique f-just on average allocation.
This proposition assures that when we speak about an allocation that is f-just on average
we are not speaking about an empty concept. That is, finding an f-just on average allocation is
always possible. Moreover, the proposition states that choosing among such allocations is not
a problem since there is never more than one. This enables us to define the averagef-jurt rule
as the rule that assigns each bankruptcy problem its unique average f-just allocation. The next
proposition states that [he average f-just rule inherits the basic properties ofthe bilateral principle
f.13
PROPOSITION 4.2: Let f be a monotone and anonymous bilateral principle. Then, the average f-
just rule is monotone and anonymous.
Proof ofproposition 4.1:
Lemma 4.3: If a rule is monotone then it is continuous in the estate.
Proof: L.et {(E,,;d)}~-, be a sequence of bankruptcy problems that converges to (E;d) and let
f be a monotone rule. By monotonicity, for all n? 1 and for all i E I, 0~ ~ f;(E,,;d)-f;(E;d) ~ ~ ~ E„
E ~. Since {E~} ~-, converges to E, it follows that {f;(E~;d)}~-, converges [o f;(E;d) for all i E I
and therefore {f(E;d)}~-, converges to f(E~;d). o
Let (E;d) be an n-creditor bankruptcy problem and let f be a monotone and anonymous
bilateral principle. Define the following function:
T:A(E;d}-~A(E;d)~T(x)-t
where t;-(n-1)-'E~ ~;f;(x;t xt; (d;,dt)),
and n is [he number of creditors in (E;d).
To see that T maps allocations of (E;d) into allocations, first note that for all i and j in I and
for all xE A(E;d), O S f;(x;fx~;(d;,d~)) 5d;. Hence, O S(n-1)-'E~x;f;(x; fx~;(d;,d~)) Sd;. Moreover,
E~ei(n-1)-'E,x~f~(x~fx,:(d„d~)) - ín-1)-'E~~t~f~(x~fx,;(d~,d;))}f;(x~fx;;íd„d~))) -
(n-1)-'E;~~(x;tx~) - E;E,x; - E. Clearly, the set of allocations A(E;d) is compac[ and convex.
Moreover, since f is monotone lemma 4.3 implies that T is continuous. Hence by Brouwer's
fixed point theorem, T has a fixed point. Clearly, any fixed point of T is an average fjust
allocation of (E;d) and conversely, any allocation in (E;d) that is f-just on average, is a fixed
point of T.
For any x in R' let ~~ x I~ -E;E, ~ x; ~. The uniqueness part will follow from the following lemma:14
Lemma 4.4: Let x and y be two allocations in (E;d). If x~y then ~~ T(x)-T(y) H C p x-y ~.
Proof: Let x and y be two distinct allocations in (E;d). By definition of T and by the triangle
nx~yuality we havc:
~ T,(x)-T,(Y) ~- ~(n-1) ~1;;:~f~(x~f xi:(d~.dy))-(n-1)'E~:~f~(Y~fYi:(d;.d;)) ~
5(n-1)'E;:~ ~ f~(x~f x;:(d~,d~))-f~(Y~tY;:(dc.d~)) ~.
Summing over all creditors i we have:
IIT(x)-T(y)II ~(n-1)'E~eiE;:~~f~(x~fx;;(d~,d;))-f;(Y~}Y;;(d„à,))~
c(n-1)'E~e~E;~~I ~ f~(x~tx;;(d;,d~)-f{Y;fY;;(d„d;)) ~ f ~f~(~fx;;(d;,d~~f{Y~fY;;(d,d~) ~ 1.
By monotonicity, the tetms inside the absolute values have the same sign, hence
~(n-1)-' E~e~E;~~I ~ f~(x~ }x;;(d~,d;))-f;(Y~ fY;;(d~.d;)) f f~(x~f x;; (d;,d;))-f;(Y~ fYr(d„d;)) ~ 1,
and since f assigns allocations,
s(n-1)-'E~e iE;~~ I(x~ }x;)-(y; fy;) I.
By the triangle inequality, ~ (x; f x~)-(y;fy~) ~ 5 ~ x~y; ~ f ~ xïy~~ and since x~y, for some pair of
creditors i and j this last inequality is strict. Therefore,
IIT(x)-T(Y)II G(n-1)"~E~EiE;~~I~x~ Y~~ f ~xïyi~l
-1~2(n-1)"'E~eiE;:~[~x~Y~~ f ~xïY;~1
-112(n-1)"'IEcei(n-1)~x~ Y~~ fE~eiE;s~~xï Y;~l
-112(n-1)"'[Eie1(n-2)~x~ Y~~ tEiEl~jEl~xïYi~~
-112(n-1)"`~(n-2) ~ x-Y ~~ fn ~~ x-Y b 1
- ~~ x-Y u . o
It follows immediately from lemma 4.4 tha[ if x and y are fixed points of T, they must be equal.
'This completes the proof of proposition 4.1. o
Proof of Proposition 4.2: Since the anonymity part is trivial, we shall only ptrove the15
monotonicity of the average f-just rule. Let (E;d) be a bankruptcy problem and let 0 S E' C E.
Denote by x and by y the average f-just allocations of (E;d) and (E';d) respectively. Assume by
contradiction that y~ ~ xk for some creditor k. By an argument analogous to the one in lemma
4.4, we have
IIT(x)-T(Y)~~ ~(n-1)'E~eiE,~~I(x~fx,)-(Y~~Y,)~.
By the triangle inequality, ~(x;f x~)-(y;fy~) ~ ~ ~ x;Y; ~ f ~ x~y~ ~ for each pair of creditors i and j.
But since for some creditor k yk 1 xr, and since E;E;z;1 E;E;y;, for some pair of creditors i and
j the triangle inequality is strict. Therefore,
IIT(x)-T(Y)II c(n-1)-'E~E~E;~~I~x~ Y~~ }~xïy;~l.
Again, by the same argument as in lemma 4.4, we get
II T(x)-T(y) II c II x-Y ~~ contradicting the fact that x and y are both fixed points. o
Since f-just allocations are also fjust on average, it follows from proposition 4.1 the
well-known result that if f-just allocations exist, they are unique. The next proposition shows that
we can use the operator T defined in the proof of proposition 4.1 to define a dynamic process
that always converges to the average f-just allocation.
PxopostTiotv 4.5: Let at~ be an allocation in (E;d) and define inductively x,-T(x,-,) for t70. {x,}
converges to the average f-just allocation.
Proot~: Since x,EA(E;d) and A(E;d) is bounded, {x,} has a convergent subsequence {x,~~}. I.et
y be the limit of this subsequence. Since A(E;d) is closed, yEA(E;d). It is sufficient to show
that y is the unique f-just on average allocation in (E;d), which will be denoted by x. It follows
from lemma 4.4 that { ~~ x,-x ~} is a non increasing sequence of non negative real numbers, hence
NI'his proof is due to Sjaak Hurkens.16
it must have a limit, i.e, II x,-x N-~a. Since {x,~~~} and {T(x,n~)} are subsequences of {x,} we must
have ~I x,;,,-x N~ II Y-x II -a and by continuity of T, N T(x,~~,)-x N-~ N T(y)-x II -a. But then q y-
x II - N T(Y)-x N- II T(y)-T(x) II and lemma 4.4 implies that y-x-T(x). o
We can now proceed to the proof of theorem 3.2.
Proof of theorem 3.2: The proof will follow from the following lemmas:
Lemma 4.5: Let f be a monotone and anonymous bilateral principle. Let (E;d) be a banktuptcy
problem with at least three creditors and x an allocation in it. If there exists an f-just allocation
in each 3-creditor reduced problem with respect to x then ~~ is transitive.
Proof: L.et (E;d) be a bankruptcy problem and let x be an allocation in it. Let i, j and k three
creditors such that i},j and j~xk. L.et (E';d') be the reduced banktuptcy problem of {i,j,k} with
respect to x, i.e., (E';d'): -(x;fx~fxr;(d;,d~,d~)). Let x" be the f-just allocation of this problem.
It must be the case that xk G x~. For otherwise, since j ~~h, lemma 3.1 implies x~ ~ x~` and since
i~~j, the same lemma implies x;1x~` contradicting the fact that x;-4.x~-t-xr-x~`fx~`txr. Hence,
x, G xk. Analogously, it must be that x; ~x'. Hence by lemma 3.1 i~„k. This completes the proof
of lemma 4.5.
L.emma 4.6: Let f be a monotone and anonymous bilateral principle. Let (E;d) be an n-creditor
bankruptcy problem and let x be the average f-just allocation in it. If ~~ is transitive, then x is
an f-just allocation.
Proof: Assume by contradiction that x is not f-just and ~~ is transitive. Sirtce x is not fjust,
there are two creditors i and j such that i~~j and since x is f-just on average, there exists a
creditor k such that j~,k. By transitivity i~„k and by irreflexivity, i~ k. Again, since x is fyust17
on average there exists a creditor m such that k~,m. The above arguments show that m is
different from the previous creditors. Applying [hese arguments n times will contradict the fact
that there are n creditors. This completes the proof of lemma 4.6.
To see that theorem 3.2 follows from lemmas 4.5 and 4.6, let (E;d) be a bankruptcy problem.
If for each allocation x in it ~x is transitive, then in particular it is transitive when x is an f-just
on average allocation, which by proposition 4.1 exists and is unique. But in this case lemma 4.6
ensures that x is the f-just allocation of (E;d). Conversely, if x is an f-just allocation in (E;d),
then x ~J is an f-just allocation in the reduced bankruptcy problem of J with respect to x for all
J containing exactly 3 creditors. Therefore, by lemma 4.5 ~~ is transitive for all alloca[ions x.
0
CoRO~t.nRY 4.7: Let f be a monotone and anonymous bilateral principle. For each 3-creditor
bankruptcy problem there exists an f-just allocation if and only if for each bankruptcy problem
there exists an f-just allocation.
Proof: Lemma 4.5 says that if for each 3-creditor bankruptcy problems there exists an fjust
allocation then ~, is transitive for all allocations x and theorem 3.2 ensures that in this case ihere
exists an f-just allocation in each bankruptcy problem. The other direction is immediate. a
This corollary says that the answer to the question of the existence of a consistent
extension to a specific bilateral principle, lies in the family of 3-ct~editor problems. If there is
no consistent extension of a bilateral principle f, then we must be able to find a 3-creditor
problem with no f-just allocation.18
Theorem 3.2 states that there is a connection between the existettce of f-just allocations
and the transitivity of the relations ~x. On the other hand, a rule may well be consistent while
the weak relations ~x are not transitive. To see this, consider the following bankruptcy problem:
(E;d): -(400;(300, 2tb, 100)) and the following allocation: x-(160, 140, 100). When f is the
constrained equal award rule it is easy to see that 2Yx3, 3z~1 but 1~~2. However, the following
theorem states that there is some relation between the transitivity of the weak relations z, and
the strict monotonicity of the bilateral principle f.
TtieoK~M 4.8: Let f be a monotone and anonymous bilateral principle. f is strictly monotone
and for each bankruptcy problem there exists an f-just a(location if and only if for each
bankruptcy problem with no zero creditors and for all allocations x in it z, is transitive.
Proof: Only if: Let (E;d) be a banktuptcy problem, let x be an allocation in it and let f be a
strictly monotone rule. We shall show that z, is transitive whenever there is an fjust allocation
in (E;d). Assume that there are three players i, j and k such that iz,j and jz„k. Consider the
reduced bankruptcy problem of i.j and k with respect to x and denote by x~ its f-just allocation
(by assumption, this allocation ezists). Since iz~j, lemma 3.1 implies that either x;Zx~` or
x~ S x?` . Since j~xk, lemma 3.1 implies that either x~ z x! or xt5 xr. Assume by contradiction
that k~,i. Then again by lemma 3.1 either x;Gx~ or xrlxk. But it follows from the previous
inequalities that in either case x~-x~`. So if x; G x~`, then x;fx~ G x}fx?` and by strict
monotoniciry of f we have fj(x;fx;)Gf;(x~fx~)-x~`-x;, contradicting the fact that iz,j. But if
xk 1 x~ then x~ txk 1 xj fxr. Hence by strict monotonicity of f we have
fj(X~f Xk)1 fj(x~`f xr)-x~` - x~, contradicting the assumption that j z~1t.
If: Assume z, is transitive for every bankruptcy problem (E;d) with no zero creditors and19
allocation x in it, and that f is not strictly monotone. Then there are two 2-creditor bankruptcy
problems (E;d) and (E';d) with 05E'GE, 1-{i,j}, d~0 with f;(E;d)-f;(E';d)-x; and
x~-f~( E;d)1 f;(E';d)-y~. Let(E';d~`) -(x; f x~fy~;(d;,dt,dt)) and let x EA(E';d') be the allocation
(x;,x;,y~). By constntction 2~x1, lzx3 and 3Y,2 which contradicts the transitivity of z,. Finally
note that the transitivity of ~, implies the transitivity of ~x. Hence by theorem 3.2, if z~ is
transitive, there is an f-just allocation in each bankruptcy problem (E;d). o
5.CONCLUSION
The motivation for this paper is to find conditions on bilateral principles, that assure the
possibility of extending them to a consistent n-creditor rule. However, an alternative motivation
can be found. Since a characterization of the bilateral principles mentioned above is equivalent
to a characterization of the consistent rules induced by them, our main result can be viewed as
an equivalence theorem for the class of monotone and consistent rules.This equivalence theorem,
in contrast to Young`s, characterizes the monotone and consistent rules by properties that relate
to allocations that the rules do not recornmend. Although different in nature, our results provides
a new interpretation of parametric representations of bankruptcy rules.
Many bilateral principles do not have a consistent extension (for example the 2-creditor
MP rule). The introduction of consistency on average seems a natural alternative. We believe
that further study of these rules may be of interest.20
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